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Abstract
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is defined by its unique
characteristics involving both the cyber and physical do-
mains. Their hybrid nature introduces new attack vec-
tors, but also provides an opportunity to design new
security defenses. In this paper, we present a new
domain-specific security mechanism, FIRED, that lever-
ages physical properties such as inertia of the CPS to im-
prove security.
FIRED is simple to describe and implement. It goes
through two operations: Reset and Diversify, as fre-
quently as possible – typically in the order of seconds
or milliseconds. The combined effect of these opera-
tions is that attackers are unable to gain persistent con-
trol of the system. The CPS stays safe and stable even
under frequent resets because of the inertia present. Fur-
ther, resets simplify certain diversification mechanisms
and makes them feasible to implement in CPSs with lim-
ited computing resources.
We evaluate our idea on two real-world systems: an
engine management unit of a car and a flight controller
of a quadcopter. Roughly speaking, these two systems
provide typical and extreme operational requirements for
evaluating FIRED in terms of stability, algorithmic com-
plexity, and safety requirements. We show that FIRED
provides robust security guarantees against hijacking at-
tacks and persistent CPS threats. We find that our de-
fense is suitable for emerging CPS such as commod-
ity unmanned vehicles that are currently unregulated and
cost sensitive.
1 Introduction
A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) represents the synthe-
sis of computational and physical processes encompass-
ing a wide range of applications including transportation,
medical, robots, and power grids. CPSs usually consist
of a controller, sensors, actuators and a network. Known
attacks, academic and real-world, on CPSs are diverse
and span both the cyber and physical domains. Cyber at-
tacks like the Jeep Hack by Miller et al. [24] and Tesla
remote hack by the Keen group [3] and physical attacks
such as those on car sensors by Yan et al. [11] are just
a few that have appeared in the media recently. The
dangers were first highlighted by the pioneering work of
Koscher et al. [22] and Checkoway et al. [10].
Current state of the art defenses for CPSs can be un-
derstood as defenses for the physical portion of the CPS,
viz., the sensors, and cyber portion of the CPS, viz. the
control and communication software. The physical de-
fenses leverage physical properties to detect and mitigate
sensor spoofing, sensor jamming, and other similar types
of attacks. Current cyber defenses, typically designed for
more traditional systems, are usually incompatible for
a CPS due to timing or computing constraints but have
been adapted by modifying some of the operational pa-
rameters.
In contrast to current cyber defenses for CPSs, which
are adaptations of cyber defenses, in this paper, we pro-
pose a new software security defense for CPS that lever-
ages unique properties of CPSs. A key innovation in our
approach is that we take advantage of inertia, i.e., the
ability of the CPS to stay in motion or at rest, and its
ability to tolerate transient imperfections in the physical
world, to survive attacks. Basically we reset the con-
troller software as frequently as possible without impact-
ing safety. The security benefit of the frequent reset de-
fense is that it limits the time for which the system is vul-
nerable to attacks. Additionally, diversification is used to
force the adversary to develop a new attack strategy af-
ter every reset; that is, attacks after each reset should be
independent of each other, lowering the likelihood of an
attack’s success.
Our system, FIRED, is best understood with an exam-
ple. Consider a drone: even if power is cut off to the en-
gine, the drone will continue to glide due to inertia; sim-
ilarly, even if a few sensor inputs are incorrect, the drone
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
2.
06
59
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
Y]
  2
1 F
eb
 20
17
will continue to operate safely because intermittent sen-
sor errors happen in normal operation and controllers are
designed to handle this case. In FIRED, we take advan-
tage of these features. We intentionally reset the system
periodically to clear state that may have been corrupted
by an attacker. During resets, we rely on system inertia to
continue operating, and we diversify to prevent the same
attacks from breaking the system.
It is easy to see why FIRED is uniquely suited to
CPSs as a defensive technique. If traditional digital, non-
physical systems are reset frequently, because they lack
inertia, they cannot independently survive resets. To wit,
consider reseting a server every few network packets. In
order to recover from missed packets, an external entity
needs to retransmit them. In contrast, in a CPS, the feed-
back loops present help them independently rebuild the
state that might have been lost due to the reset. Addi-
tionally, the physical components of the system, due to
inertia, continue operating even when there is no compu-
tation by the controller. Finally, the network packets can
arrive in the order of nanoseconds in a traditional digital,
non-physical system while the reset times are in the order
of seconds. For CPS data often arrives on human scales
(milliseconds) and reboot times are also much shorter.
Realizing FIRED for CPSs is not without challenges.
While all CPSs have inertia, the amount of inertia they
have is variable. Resetting too frequently may cause the
safety requirements of the system to be violated if the
inertia cannot cover the operational and safety require-
ments during controller downtime during reset. Further,
computational resources are constrained on most CPSs
due to cost and power requirements. In this paper we
show a systematic method to determine the frequency of
reset and an implementation of FIRED that allows CPS
to be secured in a pragmatic way.
We evaluate FIRED on two popular CPSs with dif-
ferent inertia and safety requirements. Using an open
source engine controller—rusEFI—and measurements
from a real combustion engine, we discuss and measure
the performance and safety impacts. Additionally, we
evaluate FIRED on a Flight Controller (FC) for a quad-
copter which exhibits more limited inertia. We find that
both of these systems tolerate multiple frequent resets.
The engine can tolerate resets at intervals of 125ms while
the quadcopter at an interval as frequent as a second. We
additionally define appropriate safety requirements for
each and show that FIRED does not violate them. Thus,
FIRED provides a novel way for enhancing the security
of CPSs without impacting safety, with low resource re-
quirements, and a simple implementation using unique
properties of CPSs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the
next section we describe a system model for a CPS sys-
tem that we use, in the following section we describe
Figure 1: CPS System Model. The portion enclosed in
the dotted area corresponds to the safety critical compo-
nents.
the attack model. We then describe our FIRED tech-
nique in Section 4, provide security and safety analy-
sis in Section 5, and evaluate FIRED on representative
case studies—an Engine Control Unit (ECU) and a Flight
Controller (FC)—discussed in Section 7. We conclude in
Section 10 with applicability and limitations.
2 System Model
Overall Architecture: Current CPSs have four main
subsystems: a subsystem that interfaces with the physical
world that includes the sensors and the actuators, a sub-
system that takes inputs from the sensors and generates
commands for the actuators—the control subsystem,—a
subsystem that takes in external commands, and finally
a subsystem the provides non-critical functions such as
entertainment subsystem. In most CPSs today these sub-
systems are not isolated from each other creating a quag-
mire of security problems. However, recognizing these
dangers, emerging CPS designs include primitives for
isolation (such as separating out the networks in a car),
sensor authentication and encryption to name a few.
We set our work in this emerging model and we con-
sider the safety and security of only the software that pro-
vides control over the physical system (i.e. the safety
critical components). The enclosed portion of Figure 1
illustrates our model. The rationale for this choice is to
focus our attention on aspects that are unique to CPS. A
wide variety of systems fall into this model, such as un-
manned transport vehicles or industrial control systems.
Resource Model: CPS resources can vary wildly.
However, a large subset of these systems rely on micro-
controllers. They tend to execute from ROM or Flash
chips with limited memory (typically hundreds of KBs or
a few MBs), have no memory management unit (MMU),
only a memory protection unit (MPU); and the perfor-
mance offered by these microcontroller-based systems
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is orders of magnitude lower compared to traditional
microprocessor-based systems such as servers and smart-
phones. The primary driving factor for the system de-
sign choices is the cost of components, and a need to
provide real-time deterministic execution characteristics
which preempts use of speculative techniques for achiev-
ing high performance. As a result of these stringent
resources and requirements, these systems usually run
a library operating system—commonly referred to as
Real-Time OS (RTOS)—variant1, and porting of exist-
ing security defenses that weren’t designed for these low-
resource devices can be difficult or sometimes impossi-
ble. Similarly, these architectural or platform differences
present challenges to mounting certain classes of attacks.
For instance, modifying even a small amount of data, say
one byte, requires an entire Flash sector to be modified
at once, that incurs latencies in the order of hundreds of
milliseconds to seconds. So persistent attacks that need
to modify Flash can take several seconds while the same
can be accomplished in hundreds of nanoseconds on tra-
ditional systems – nearly seven orders of magnitude dif-
ference.
CPS Properties: With these system and resource models
in mind, we can begin to discuss some of the important
properties of cyber-physical systems that allow for inter-
esting security techniques to be explored. These prop-
erties stem from the design, algorithms, and physics of
CPSs. The main properties of CPSs are:
They move. CPSs operate in the physical domain and
as a result involve some form of lateral or rotational mo-
tion. This motion leads these systems to have inertia–
the resistance of an object to any change in its motion.
This is essential for FIRED as it asserts that these sys-
tems can continue operation and exhibit a tolerance to
missed events, either by design or due to faults.
Environment can be observed. The fact that CPSs can
observe their environment using sensors is fundamental
in their design and operation. The inclusion of sensors
also means that any actuation of the system can be ob-
served by the sensors. This further implies that the state
of the system that caused the actuation can be relearned
by the sensors. Roughly speaking this is the same as
storing the state of the system (before actuation) to a
data store outside the system (the environment), and then
reading it back to the system (through the sensors). This
feature is critical for FIRED as it allows for certain state
to be discarded from the system during resets, i.e., trans-
mitted out of the system before a reset, and re-observed
once out of reset. The quality of state may be degraded in
this process but as we will see next, CPSs are, by design,
resilient to modest degradation.
Imperfections are tolerable. The physical quantities that
need to be sensed are continuous where as digital sys-
tems are discrete. This mismatch requires conversion
from continuous data to discrete data which introduces
quantization error - as a concrete example, while quanti-
ties such as pressure, temperature etc. can in theory have
infinite precision, the precision of the readings is limited
by the analog-to-digital converter found in these sensors
which is typically 8-12 bits. Thus the inputs to a CPS are
approximations of the real world. Furthermore, sensors
also have accuracy problems as the sensing mechanism
can (and does) provide a different response depending on
environmental conditions, not all of which can be com-
pletely characterized. Also, physical artifacts in the en-
vironment (such as flying close to an electric line) can
perturb sensors. As a result, algorithms and hardware of
a CPS are typically designed to account for modest lev-
els of uncertainty. Thus, these systems include multiple
sensors from which physical world measurements can be
estimated. Furthermore, the algorithms are capable of
self-correction. As we will see later this property will
allow FIRED to operate smoothly.
3 Adversary Model
Attack Surfaces: The emerging CPS model considered
in this paper has three attack surfaces:
(1) Sensors & Actuators: The CPS’s interface to the
physical world through sensors and actuators. This is
susceptible to physical threats such as tampering of sen-
sors and/or actuators, sensor spoofing and jamming.
(2) Software: The control software that handles in-
coming queries, processes sensor data, and computes ac-
tuator commands. This is susceptible to the more tra-
ditional software threats such as those stemming from
memory vulnerabilities, integer overflows, etc.
(3) Network: The network that connects the vari-
ous components to the controller. This is susceptible to
threats such as man-in-the-middle type attacks.
For this work, we consider an adversary that seeks to
exploit the control software for these CPSs. We point
out that physical-subsystem attacks may serve as entry
points to exploit the control software.
Physical-subsystem Attacks: Physical attacks typi-
cally target state estimation and control; in fact, much
work has been done on this front. Attacks on state esti-
mation usually manifest themselves in one of two ways:
sensor spoofing and sensor jamming. The difference be-
tween these two threats is effectively in the level of con-
trol that can be exerted over the sensor, with spoofing
being more sophisticated than jamming. Examples of
these works are presented by Kerns et al. [19] where
they spoof GPS signals to capture and control unmanned
aircraft, Davidson et al. [13] who describe how to spoof
optical flow sensors in quadcopters, Kune et al. [23] that
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present how electromagnetic interference can be used to
attack sensors, and Son et al. [33] which incapacitates a
drone’s gyroscopes by using intentional noise. It is also
important to note that while these attacks are physical in
nature, they can affect the cyber component of the sys-
tem or provide the opportunity for certain cyber attacks
to become effective. Also, jamming and spoofing attacks
require a degree of spatial proximity: the jamming or
spoofing device needs to keep up with the motion of the
CPS for continued action.
Cyber-subsystem Attacks: Attacks in the cyber por-
tion of a CPS are essentially the same as those seen on
more traditional systems. For example, memory vulner-
abilities, such as code reuse and data corruption, are as
much a problem for CPS as for other systems. Work by
Checkoway et al. [10] and Koscher et al. [22] provide a
CPS specific discussion on some of these threats. As dis-
cussed above, physical threats can indirectly trigger cer-
tain cyber vulnerabilities, for example, integer overflows
and underflows. Maliciously manipulated sensor values
can cause incorrect branches to be executed in the control
algorithms, or worse trigger CPU specific vulnerabilities
such as those discussed by Rosenberg [29] for the ARM
TrustZone.
Goals and Capabilities: We make specific assump-
tions about an adversary’s capabilities.
Attacker’s intention is to gain a persistent foothold
into the system. Achieving persistence involves com-
promising at least one of the controllers available. By
gaining a persistent foothold, an adversary can hijack the
targeted system and attack at a time and place of their
choosing. In other words, an attacker’s immediate objec-
tive is to sacrifice the integrity of the system. Prior work
has considered availability attacks [30] and the defenses
provided here are orthogonal to prior defenses.
An attacker will avoid causing irreversible harm to
the system. Since an attacker’s objective is to persist
in the system any irreversible damage may compromise
their goals. As a result, an attacker will avoid inducing
fatal failure modes (i.e. destruction of the system).
An attacker has complete knowledge of the system in-
ternals. The physics of the system and the control algo-
rithms used are known to the attacker.
An attacker’s sphere of influence is bounded. For
physical sensor threats an adversary is usually assumed
to have access to the physical medium used by the sen-
sor. However, they may not always be within proximity;
they may be limited by their equipment or other environ-
mental factors. Similarly, an attacker may be temporally
limited.
All these assumptions correspond to stronger adver-
saries and realities of CPS attacks.
4 FIRED
FIRED is a defensive security technique tailored for
CPSs. It combines two orthogonal, but complementary
techniques: reset and diversification. This combination
in conjunction with the unique properties of CPSs, play
off each other to provide stronger security than either
technique on its own. We discuss the intuition behind
FIRED below.
Why Reset? FIRED takes advantage of a simple and
universally applicable panacea for software problems, re-
setting. Even among expert users, a reset is the preferred
solution for nearly any problem in the computing world.
The simple intuition behind the effectiveness of this ap-
proach is that software is tested most often in its pristine,
fresh state as discussed by Oppenheimer et al. [25] and
Ding [14]. With respect to the overall health of the sys-
tem, the conditions of a reset provide a predictable and
well defined behavior.
From the viewpoint of thwarting an attacker, the
restoration of state, whether it be code, data, or configu-
ration typically helps prevent an attacker’s ability to cor-
rupt the system. For example, simple resets can remove
the effects of non persistent attacks that live in memory.
More sophisticated reset mechanisms that may restore
code or other information, could protect against persis-
tent threats. By frequently performing resets, FIRED
limits the effects an attack might have, as well as, the
time an attack has to complete. In other words, an at-
tack has a bounded time horizon over which it can affect
the system, simply because its effects are frequently re-
moved.
Why Diversify? Typically, once a vulnerability is
identified, an adversary can continuously carry out an
attack as long as the vulnerability remains present. To
remedy this, some variability must be introduced into
the system. Otherwise, the same vulnerability would
persist. System diversification introduces randomness to
prevent the system from being compromised by the same
method continuously. The benefits of such an approach
have been shown to be successful in a number of related
works. As a consequence of diversification, FIRED is
able to lower the adversary’s chance of success.
Why Reset & Diversify? In combination, these tech-
niques provide two main advantages:
The first advantage is that diversification can help pro-
tect data that needs to be carried across resets. Some
CPSs may require certain data that cannot be re-learned
during normal operation. For example, sensor calibra-
tion data of a quadcopter can only be obtained while it is
not in flight. Therefore, it must preserved across resets.
One mechanism to protect such data is to take advantage
of diversification. Diversification can be used to change
the location of the data on every reset, making it harder
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for an adversary to locate this persisted data. Another
mechanism is encryption. Alternatively, the diversifica-
tion strategy may encrypt the data with a rotating key
that is changed on every reset, making it more difficult to
corrupt the data.
The second advantage is that resets can simplify the
implementation of certain diversification strategies. For
example, re-diversification on traditional systems is typ-
ically managed in the following two ways. One way
involves running a shadow copy of the program. The
shadow copy is diversified in memory and then swapped
in with the original program. This technique works well
for applications such as RESTful—stateless–APIs, be-
cause state information does not need to be shared be-
tween the copies. Another diversification mechanism in-
volves a technique known as taint-tracking that allows
pointers and other data structures to be tracked during
execution. Taint-tracking allows for application state to
be migrated between diversified copies of the program.
Both of these techniques add a significant level of com-
plexity in order to achieve re-diversification. This addi-
tional complexity may make it impractical or impossi-
ble to do on certain types of CPSs where resources (e.g
RAM) may be limited. With FIRED, the combination
of resets an diversification can help obtain similar results
with less complexity. Since resets bring the program to a
known point and the majority of the application state is
discarded, the amount of pointers or other similar data
structures that need to be migrated is significantly re-
duced. FIRED can simply re-diversify and restart exe-
cution.
Why does this work for CPS? As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, CPSs have unique properties. We can rely on in-
ertia to survive resets—the system continues operating
during a reset even while missing events. We can also
rely on the system’s observability to re-learn about state
of the system, and on tolerance to recover from a reset
without any intervention. These properties allow us to
exploit certain benefits that make tasks such as diversifi-
cation and resets simpler and practical for resource lim-
ited CPS.
These scenarios can prove difficult to adapt to tradi-
tional IT systems as they do not necessarily share these
properties. Traditional systems would potentially rely
on replication to emulate some of the benefits of inertia.
This replication is usually done at the cost of additional
memory or hardware. To account for the lack in observ-
ability, traditional systems might require a secure data
store or some external entity from which to recover it’s
state.
What parameters can we tune? We consider FIRED
to have three distinct modes of operation based on when
it chooses to employ reset:
Periodic Mode – The interval between resets is fixed.
attack durationreset interval
0
1
probability of attack success
Figure 2: Success probability of a deterministic attack.
The probability remains zero until the adversary collects
enough information but goes up to one after that.
attack duration
0
1
probability of attack success
reset interval
Figure 3: Success probability of an probabilistic attack.
The probability gradually goes up as the adversary tries
different guess for a successful attack. It will eventually
reach one if the search is done exhaustively.
For example, the quadcopter resets every 1-2s.
Random Mode – The interval between resets is ran-
domly picked from a predetermined range that is consid-
ered to be safe.
Adaptive Mode – The interval between resets is depen-
dent on a certain set of criteria. In this mode the system
or an observer monitors the effects of a reset and selec-
tively chooses when to execute the reset. These criteria
are covered in the safety analysis in Section 5.2.
These modes of operation have their own security
strengths and weaknesses. Another parameter to tune is
the diversification strategy. Although FIRED does not
specify a particular diversification strategy, proper selec-
tion impacts the strength of FIRED. Analysis on these
topics are provided in Section 5.
5 FIRED Analysis
In this section we take a closer look at analyzing FIRED
specifically with respect to its security and safety. For the
analysis of FIRED, we first consider the periodic mode
and then expand the arguments to other modes.
5.1 Security
How does the platform affect security? For
microcontroller-based CPSs, the platform alone can im-
pose certain limitations on the attacker’s capabilities es-
pecially when considering the time bound imposed by
frequent resets. To achieve persistence on these devices
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that normally execute from Flash, an attacker has two op-
tions: (1) copy the contents of a flash sector(s) to RAM,
modify the contents in memory, erase the sector(s), and
finally write the contents of memory back to flash. (2)
Toggle ’1’ bits to ’0’ bits in place on flash to modify the
contents.
The steps taken for option 1 take a significant amount
of time. To give some context, the microcontroller used
in our case studies have flash whose smallest sector
size is 16KB. Erasing this 16KB sector takes approx-
imately 210ms and writing (the “program” operation)
takes around 460ms. If FIRED is able to reset quickly
enough, an attacker’s attempt to achieve persistence can
be thwarted. An attacker may use option 2, i.e., clear all
bits to 0 for individual sectors, to reduce these delays to
just the program phase. However, this option is signifi-
cantly limited. To understand why, let us say the attacker
wants to change code or data. The only option they have
is to change all of the bits to 0. For instance, if an instruc-
tion is set a jump to 0x40000. By writing to the sector an
attacker can change the jump to 0x00000. This is usually
an illegal address that causes a memory fault. Further, all
other instructions would be changed to 0x00 in the adja-
cent bytes. The same applies to data pages (which need
to be programmed for 64KB or larger). So while option 2
may be useful to construct certain portions of an exploit,
it is highly restrictive and unlikely to be general-purpose.
In fact, the only known microcontroller rootkit [16] does
not use the second option.
How are different attack categories affected? We
discuss timeliness more concretely by analyzing the
probability of an adversary’s success and where FIRED
fits in. Attacks generally fall within two separate cate-
gories represented by their respective probability func-
tions. The first category, shown in Figure 2, describes an
attack that until some condition is met has zero chance
of success. This probability function models a memory
disclosure attack in which a certain portion of memory
must be harvested before the attacker has a chance to hi-
jack the system. Published works describing these types
of attacks report that they require a substantial amount
of time. If the time to harvest memory is longer than the
reset interval, then FIRED successfully defends against
the adversary. The second category, shown in Figure 3,
describes an attack that over time, slowly becomes more
and more likely to succeed as they exhaust their search
space. This probability function models a guessing at-
tempt to find the location of core data structures on a
system without FIRED, where given enough time an at-
tacker can eventually hijack the system. Because FIRED
bounds the duration of an attack, it essentially restricts
the probability of hijack. As long as the reset interval
TR is short enough, then the probability of attack suc-
cess should remain well below one. For both of these
attack categories, diversification seeks to ensure that the
attacker’s previous attempts are invalidated and therefore
the probability of attack success remains close to 0.
What known attacks can FIRED protect against?
We will discuss two concrete attacks and how FIRED
provides protection. The first are rootkits. The body of
published rootkits for microcontrollers is limited. How-
ever, Travis Goodspeed has done significant work explor-
ing the area developing rootkits for the MSP430 micro-
controller [16]. The rootkit achieves persistence by writ-
ing its payload to flash. Had the system with the MSP430
been reset frequently enough, it might have prevented the
rootkit.
A second example of a threat which FIRED can pro-
vide relief are defeat devices. These defeat devices have
been recently brought into the spotlight after the Volk-
swagen incident. These devices gather data over time for
a variety of parameters such as engine runtime and wheel
rotation. They then determine how they should modify
their behavior according to whether they are being in-
spected or not. Because FIRED’s resets essentially clear
the data that these ECUs are capturing, it can prevent
them from determining the conditions of an emissions
test. Of course if the adversary knew about the resets
they may engineer more cleverer defeat devices.
What are appropriate diversification techniques?
FIRED does not specify the diversification technique that
must be used. Because CPS applications have tight tim-
ing requirements, a diversification technique appropriate
for one system may not be applicable for the other. Fur-
thermore, resource constraints of a particular system may
limit that techniques can be implemented. An example of
an applicable diversification strategy candidate relies on
execution path randomization similar to Isomeron [12].
Such a strategy can be implemented at compile time with
limited runtime support making it appropriate for em-
bedded devices. A compile time Isomeron variant can
additionally support resets. For example, a snapshot of
RAM state can be restored from a known point without
the need of patching addresses, or other variables as the
execution of the program still remains diversified.
5.2 Safety
The goal of this section is to develop a framework for
when FIRED can be applied to CPSs safely. To do so,
we (1) describe how safety requirements are determined,
(2) determine what conditions are necessary to fulfill the
requirements, and (3) define a set of parameters to relate
the effects of FIRED on safety.
From Figure 4, the time which the system needs to
recover from one reset should be a sum of the downtime
of the system where no output is generated (dR) and the
time the system needs to stabilize (dS). This is due to
6
dR
time
Reset Reset
...
dS dSS dR
TR
TR The reset interval. This is fixed for periodic mode.
dR The duration of the reset. During this time, there will
be no output.
dS The duration from the first output to where the sys-
tem enters a stable state.
dSS The duration of the stable state that must be main-
tained for safety until the next reset.
Figure 4: Intervals between resets. Each interval be-
tween resets consists of the time the system spends in
rebooting, stabilizing, and stablized state.
the typical nature of algorithms used in CPSs that may
require some observation of the environment to reach a
stable state. From Figure 4, we can clearly see that the
following equation holds:
TR = (dR +dS +dSS)
Therefore, the condition to consider is simply: Two con-
secutive resets must be separated by more than or equal
to dR +dS +dSS. In other words, TR is the parameter that
affects the safety of the system.
The above condition can also be interpreted as the ratio
of the duration of time spent in the stable state to the
time required to recover to a stable state after a reset.
The ratio D can be expressed with the previously defined
parameters as follows:
D =
dSS
(dR +dS)
Time spent in the stable state pushes the system into a
safe region, where as, time spent in recovery is time in
which the system is not producing outputs. As a result,
the higher the ratio D, the safer and more performant the
system can be considered. Given that the downtime dR
and the time until the first output dS are hard to control,
the system designer’s only practical option is to tweak
the duration of being in the stable state dSS. The ratio D
is used in Section 7 for our evaluation of safety.
How do the operation modes satisfy safety? The
three modes of operation each affect safety differently.
The Periodic and Random modes, provide similar per-
formance to the original system given that TR is chosen
appropriately. As TR decreases past some threshold de-
termined by the minimum time in the stable state, dSS,
the system stops functioning correctly. The key for these
modes is to provide the minimum TR while still provid-
ing comparable safety to the system without FIRED. The
benefit for these approaches is their simplicity, especially
in terms of implementation.
The adaptive strategy can provide the closest perfor-
mance to the normal system by continuously monitoring
its effects and is specifically meant to address safety level
S2. If FIRED considers that its actions will violate any of
the safety requirements, TR can be continuously vary be-
tween an upper and lower bound. The difficulty with this
strategy is determining the appropriate metric to monitor
which varies from system to system.
How do we include diversification? While FIRED
does not define a particular diversification strategy, one
feature they all have in common is increased work. This
can result in additional delays compared to the baseline
system. In order to satisfy the safety requirements, the
additional overhead introduced by diversification should
still satisfy the original deadlines. Formally, determin-
ing the satisfiability of these timings is done by schedul-
ing analysis. Difficulties in accurately modeling the sys-
tem make this approach complex leading to experimen-
tation in practice. Due to the highly specific nature of
safety, further in depth discussion on the subject is pre-
sented when evaluating our case studies in Section 7. For
this evaluation, we will demonstrate appropriate safety
requirements and explore the limits of the reset interval
TR.
6 FIRED Implementation
In order to evaluate FIRED we study two distinct CPSs:
an Engine Control Unit (ECU) and a UAV flight con-
troller (FC). Each case study provides its own challenges
to determining the feasibility of FIRED, because each
case is different with respect to the physical component
under control.
6.1 Engine Control Unit
An ECU is the brain of an engine, designed to directly
process inputs from a series of sensors and supply out-
put signals to actuators to control the process of inter-
nal combustion. As is common to CPSs, an ECU must
perform a set of real-time tasks for the engine to per-
form properly. For a combustion engine to produce the
right amount of power, it must inject fuel into its internal
chamber, mix it with air, and finally ignite the air-fuel
mixture, all at the right timings. Typical engines perform
these steps in what is called the four-stroke cycle.
How it works: There are two rotating parts, the crank
and camshaft, inside an engine. The ECU observes their
revolutions to determine what the state of the engine is.
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The number of input signals that must be observed to cor-
rectly determine the engine state depends on the shapes
of the crank and camshaft. Then, the control algorithm
interpolates the time to properly schedule ignition and
injection events. Once the ECU has determined in which
phase of the combustion cycle the engine is in, it will
use other measurements from sensors, such as throttle
position, temperature, pressure, air-flow and oxygen to
accurately determine the air-fuel mixture to be injected.
Platform: For our case study we use the rusEFI
open-source ECU and a Honda CBR600RR engine, a
very commonly engine used by FSAE racing enthusi-
asts. The source-code is written in C/C++ running on
top of an open-source real-time library operating system
called ChibiOS and is designed to run on a STM32F4-
Discovery board, a widely popular micro-control unit
(MCU). This board contains a 168 MHz ARM Cortex-
M4 processor with 192 KBytes of SRAM and 1MB of
non-volatile flash memory. The MCU contains only a
Memory Protection Unit (MPU) with 8 protection re-
gions, which may be leveraged by diversification tech-
niques.
Reset Strategy: Realizing FIRED involves selecting
an appropriate reset strategy. For the ECU, we choose
to power cycle the MCU, which effectively clears out all
hardware state. Simple power cycling, or reboots, pro-
vide strong security advantages as it can be triggered
externally, without any software. Additionally, it pro-
tects against attacks which may freeze the configuration
of certain hardware peripherals. Power cycling incurs
certain costs, specifically the cost of rebooting the chip
and the time for the startup routines to reinitialize the
controller. However, we found that the cost of rebooting
the chip was on the order of microseconds and thus com-
pletely inconsequential compared to the latency of the
startup routine. The non-interactive version of rusEFI’s
startup time was 20ms (dR = 20ms.) This is still very fast
compared to Desktop systems.
Diversification Strategy: We implement a static vari-
ant of Isomeron that provides execution path randomiza-
tion. The original implementation of Isomeron uses dy-
namic binary instrumentation techniques. This approach
is not feasible on resource constrained devices. By lever-
aging existing BinUtils functionality compiler flags,
our implementation makes it suitable for our targeted de-
vices.
6.2 Flight Controller
Similar to the ECU, the flight controller is the brain of
an aircraft and is designed to ensure its stability and con-
trol. An aircraft has six degrees of freedom: translation
along the x, y, z directions and rotation about the x, y,
z axes. Each rotational axis is commonly referred to as
pitch, roll, yaw, respectively, while the three together are
refereed to as the attitude. Proper attitude control of the
aircraft is critical for its stability.
How it works: The flight controller is primarily re-
sponsible for ensuring attitude stability while aiding a
pilot or performing autonomous flight. It must read all
of the sensor data and filter the noise in order to cal-
culate proper output commands to send to its actuators.
In particular, we focus on quadrotor helicopters more
commonly referred to as quadcopters. Controlling these
quadcopters involves operating four independent rotors
to the provide six degrees of freedom. Sensors measuring
a number of physical properties are then fused together to
estimate the position and attitude of the quadcopter. This
estimation, similar to the case of ECU, require a certain
number of observation samples before an output is pro-
duced. This output is then used by other components that
determine the best command actions for the system.
Platform: For our case study we use the PX4 open-
source flight controller with a DJI F450 quadcopter air-
frame, a very common DIY kit favored by enthusiasts.
The PX4 flight controller provides attitude and position
control using a series of sensors such as GPS, optical
flow, accelerometer, gyroscope, and barometer. The PX4
controller software includes a variety of flight modes
ranging from manual, assisted, to fully autonomous. The
source-code is written in C/C++ and supports multiple
kinds of OS and hardware targets. Specifically, we use
the Pixhawk board based on the same series of MCU as
that used in the ECU case study. The overall PX4 ar-
chitecture uses two main estimators corresponding to the
six degrees of freedom: position estimator and attitude
estimator. The estimated values are passed to the po-
sition controller and attitude controller which are then
used to compute the optimal trajectory and trust vec-
tors for the quadcopter. The thrust vectors are then con-
verted from their normalized state to their raw (PWM—
pulse-width modulation) values by a mixer and the re-
sult is directly supplied to the actuators. Depending on
the flight mode, certain components function differently.
For assisted mode, pilot inputs are fed directly to the at-
titude controller to control the quadcopter, while for au-
tonomous mode the system is controlled by a navigator
which feeds coordinates to the position control.
Reset Strategy: Similar to the ECU case study, we
first attempted simple reboots. The reboot time dR for
PX4 was found to be around 1.5s. Given the more sensi-
tive physical dynamics of the quadcopter, simple reboot-
ing is not effective, i.e., the quadcopter crashed very of-
ten, prompting the need of a more efficient approach. As
a result, we implement an optimized reset strategy. We
found that much of the startup time was spent in initial-
izing data structures and setting up the system for oper-
ation. So, we create a snapshot right after all the initial-
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ization and use it to practically instantly start the system.
This provides certain security benefits as the snapshot
can be verified and signed, limiting, or even completely
eliminating the possibility of tampering from an attack.
This reset strategy takes a snapshot of the entirety of
RAM. It is then stored in a special region of flash and at
the following boot, the saved state is restored. The spe-
cial flash region is protected, and locked by the MPU.
This provides a consistent restoration point for the sys-
tem’s lifetime. This reset strategy was implemented as
an extension of the NuttX library operating system used
by the Pixhawk PX4 target. This approach takes approx-
imately 3ms (i.e dR = 3ms) to restore and is primarily
dominated by the time required to write data from flash
to RAM.
When the snapshot is taken, and what data is stored
in the snapshot, have implications on the capabilities of
the system. Depending on the flight mode for the quad-
copter the snapshot has different requirements as to what
data can be reset and persisted. For the autonomous
flight mode for example, coordinates for the quadcopter’s
flight path can be part of the snapshot. However, this
would prevent the quadcopter’s flight path from being
modified mid-flight. If this capability is desired, the said
data would need to be persisted across resets. The as-
sisted flight mode has fewer limitations. For the assisted
flight mode, which only requires the pilot inputs, a sim-
ple snapshot of the system taken after the sensors have
been calibrated is sufficient, as the system can recover
the state that it needs by reobserving the environment
through its sensors.
We found that regardless of the flight mode being used,
the snapshot could be taken once in a controlled and se-
cure environment, as long as, the system was initialized
with the correct parameters. For the assisted mode this
meant, the sensors need to be calibrated, and for the more
advanced autonomous mode, mission waypoints for nav-
igation need to be initialized with absolute values as rel-
ative measurements become a problem unless they are
designed to be persisted. Neither method degraded the
quality of the flight.
Diversification Strategy: For the flight controller we
chose to implement an alternate diversification strategy
to show the flexibility of FIRED. We use a simpler re-
randomizable stack canary strategy. On each reset, we
basically randomly generate a new canary.
7 Evaluation
The most critical component of FIRED is resets. We re-
quire careful evaluation of its effects on systems. The
main questions we study are: what is the frequency of re-
set at which the system becomes unsafe (a) for the ECU
and (b) for the flight controller. Similarly, we also study
Figure 5: A sweep of the reset interval TR and reset
downtime dR to study the effects on engine speed. We
observe that for certain combinations of TR and dR the
engine speed approximates 100%.
how the stability of system is impacted for different fre-
quency modes. In terms of the parameters setup in an
earlier Section 5, we will quantify dR, the reset down-
time, and what factors affect it, as well as, determine re-
alistic values for the reset interval TR. Fundamentally, dR
value is determined by the reset strategy used while TR is
dependent on the system physics.
Engine Control Unit: The reset time of our ECU is
20ms (dR = 20ms). The stabilization time dS for the
ECU is dependent on the number of engine cycles that
must be observed. The ECU must observe two engine
cycles to determine whether it is synchronized with the
engine’s rotation. Additionally, it must observe enough
engine cycles to compute properties that must be inte-
grated over time (eg. acceleration requires three engine
cycles). Assuming an engine speed of 4500RPM (i.e.,
approx 75Hz), each engine cycle takes 13ms, therefore
dS ≈ 39ms.
Diversification: For the ECU we studied the effects
of our Isomeron implementation. The results showed
our version introduced a constant slow down of approxi-
mately 2.13x, primarily due to its use of a hardware ran-
dom number generator. While this slow down may seem
large, the original application had more than sufficient
slack to accomodate. To put into perspective, even with
the slow down, our ECU was still within typical timing
accuracy of commercial systems. We found that diversi-
fication on the engine had no observable effect.
Safety Requirements: In order to validate the safety of
the system, we must define feasible safety requirements.
We define two such requirements: (1) The engine should
maintain its speed (i.e. 4500 RPM or 75 Hz). (2) The
engine should not stop.
We performed a set of experiments on a real engine to
explore the cost of reset as measured by the drop in en-
gine speed, and how it varies with different reset periods
(TR) and reset downtimes (dR). To determine the satisfi-
ability of the first requirement, a sweep of dR and TR are
performed given a nominal engine speed of 4500RPM.
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Figure 5 shows the change in engine speed as a percent-
age for the sweep. Each line in the graph represents a
different reset interval TR. We plot 1s, 500ms, 250ms,
125ms, and 62.5ms reboots. From Figure 5 we can see
that the first requirement, maintaining the engine speed,
can be satisfied for a wide range of dR and fR where the
engine speed is approximately 100%.
The second requirement, keeping the engine from
stopping, involves the ratio (D) of the time the engine
spends in its stable state (igniting and injecting fuel) and
the time it spends resetting. We observe that as the ratio
D decreases for a fixed TR, the engine speed decreases.
At some point, depending on the ratio D, the ECU is not
able to generate enough energy to overcome friction, and
the engine comes to a stop, in which case the safety is vi-
olated. We refer to the specific engine speed at which this
failure occurs as the stopping threshold or the minimum
dR. As we reboot more frequently, we observe lower en-
gine speeds without crossing the stopping threshold dur-
ing operation. We also note that the actual stall threshold
varies non-linearly with TR and dR, most likely due to
environmental factors and the large variability in the in-
ternal combustion process.
For our experiments, we can therefore conclude that
there are specific combinations of reset periods and re-
set downtimes for which safety can be satisfied even as
the system misses events. We further realize that perhaps
the most important factor is the ratio D as a result of the
difference in time scales between resets and physical ac-
tuation.
Flight Controller: The reset strategy implemented for
the Flight Controller takes approximately 3ms to restore
the snapshot (i.e. dR is 3ms). We will perform the rest of
the evaluation with this approach in mind.
Diversification: Similar to the ECU, we sought to ob-
serve any difference in the system’s behavior introduced
by diversification. Our simple strategy in the case of the
quadcopter, had a negligible effect.
Safety Requirements: Determining appropriate safety
requirements for the quadcopter is different from the
ECU as different flight modes may call for different re-
quirements. Similar to the ECU, we define two safety
requirements for our evaluation: (1) The quadcopter
should not oscillate during flight. In other words, it’s
attitude should be stable. (2) The quadcopter must not
crash and fall out of the sky.
These two requirements are critical to the safety of the
quadcopter as oscillations limit the control and stability
of the system, especially when attempting to hover. Ad-
ditionally, if the quadcopter falls out of the sky, then it
could cause irreparable damage to itself and others.
To better gauge the threshold at which a pilot would
begin to detect these oscillations, or in other words, the
lower limit for TR, we conducted a survey among a set
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Figure 6: The results of the poll conducted to determine
at which reset interval (TR) the quadcopter will start to
become unstable during hover. From this we can deter-
mine a minimum TR for the system.
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Figure 7: The effects of resets on the Quadcopter Stabil-
ity for various reset intervals. These results, quantify our
observations from the poll conducted.
of 20 students. The survey was conducted using an ABX
test methodology where various videos of the quadcopter
with FIRED during flight for different TR were shown.
Before conducting the survey, users were shown an ex-
ample video of a stable and unstable flight. They were
then shown videos in a random sequence and asked to de-
termine whether there were any observable oscillations
during hover flight. The results are shown in Figure 6
indicating that oscillations become significantly observ-
able somewhere between TR of one-half and one second.
Next, we relate the results of the poll to technical pa-
rameters of flight, specifically the attitude. We mounted
two Pixhawk flight controllers on the quadcopter: one
for control and the other data acquisition to address the
limitations as discussed in Section 8. To quantify the ef-
fects of Reset, the standard deviation of the quadcopter’s
attitude rate over time from the flight data used in the
polls was used. The results are shown in Figure 7. The
results show little impact on the attitude for TR > 1s and
a large spike for smaller values. This indicates that for
TR > 1s the stability of the system is roughly equivalent
to the system without FIRED and thus safety is main-
tained. At lower TR periods, we see a large spike in the
standard deviations, which correspond to when we ob-
serve the system to start oscillating.
Adaptive Mode: Given the variety of external forces
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Figure 8: Adaptive Operation Mode with wind.
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Figure 9: Braking Performance for various cars.
a quadcopter may be subject to, it makes sense for this
system to consider the Adaptive mode to satisfy safety
requirements. This would allow the system to respond
to wind, among other external factors. The upper and
lower bounds chosen for this mode, will thus determine
the minimum and maximum TR. At worst if we assume
the wind is constant the system will behave no worse
than the lower bound TR. In other words, this case will
be equivalent to the Periodic mode at the given TR. In
reality since wind is typically varied, due to gusts, the
average effective TR of system should fall somewhere be-
tween the upper and lower bounds. To demonstrate this
we simulated wind using multiple fans blowing into the
path of our quadcopter. We operate the quadcopter at
TR = 1s for half of the time and at TR = 8s for the other.
Given the direction in which our fans were blowing, Fig-
ure 8a details the quadcopter’s roll angle as affected by
the wind. The dotted line marks the point where the tran-
sition from a faster to slower reset period is made. On the
left side we see TR = 1s with high fluctuations while on
the right we see TR = 8s. From the results shown in Fig-
ure 8b we observe that the adaptive mode’s performance
follows closer to the lower bound TR = 8s.
Brake Controller: We evaluate how FIRED would
affect the braking distance of a car if deployed on a brake
controller. It is arguable what safety level (S1-S3) would
apply for a brake controller. We argue that it can be
categorized as S1 and thus FIRED applies. Under ideal
dry conditions, a car can usually achieve a deceleration
of 8m/s2. FIRED’s resets ultimately increase the stop-
ping time of the car, resulting in a slower deceleration
rate. We condiser two pairs of TR and dR, FIRED 1 and
FIRED 2 respectively. For FIRED 1, we assume a reset
period (TR) of one second and a reset duration (dR) of
100ms. The effective deceleration in this case is roughly
9% slower or 7.27(m/s2). For FIRED 2, we assume a
TR of 125ms and dR of 20ms (the same parameters as the
ECU) with an effective deceleartion of roughly 13.8%
slower or 6.96(m/s2).
Under normal driving conditions the effects of FIRED
are marginal and in fact are less than the margin of vari-
ability seen among different cars in Figure 9. Addition-
ally, a driver naturally compensates for this difference in
deceleration. It is equivalent to drivng in one car of one
make versus another. There are ways to compensate for
these decreases in deceleration as well. Perhaps the sim-
plest approach is to use tires with better traction.
8 Limitations, Mitigations and Applica-
tions
Temporary loss of control unacceptable: In some
CPSs even a temporary loss of control due to resets may
be unacceptable. Examples of these include airplanes
during landing or takeoff. Fortunately, these systems also
include multiple replicas for fail safe operation and inter-
leaved resets will solve the problem. The Boeing 787 is
an example of system that recently recommended inter-
leaved resets [2] for a safety issue. FIRED is also use-
ful for autonomous vehicles, such as commodity package
delivery drones where (a) cost is a concern to include re-
dundant components and (b) temporary loss of control
may be acceptable since humans are not in the drones to
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experience discomfort.
Wear & Tear: FIRED may have miscellaneous ef-
fects on CPSs that may not have been observable from
our current evaluation metrics. These effects can include
additional wear and tear of components for example. It
is difficult to say whether FIRED may have long term
effects as well. However, after having explored these
systems, the physical subsystems are built with ample
tolerance margins such that we may never see any ef-
fects for the duration of the systems lifetime. For exam-
ple, the rotors on quadcopters are Brushless DC motors
(BLDC). BLDCs rely on electronic commutation as op-
posed to mechanical commutation and therefore do not
suffer from much wear and tear.
Log operations: It is possible that some CPSs include
logging operations that require writing to Flash. In our
model we reset before a write to a flash sector can com-
plete thereby denying permanance. To enable logging
the CPS may have to be architected to whitelist certain
writes to special write only devices.
A drip-drip attack: While we prevent complete re-
programming of any flash sector, it is possible that an
adversary perform a partial reprogramming to somehow
get the flash memory to hold code or data they want.
This type of attack is theoretically possible, but practi-
cal issues such as controlling the voltage of the flash, or
obtaining enough writes/sectors are likely to hinder the
attacker.
9 Related Work
CPS Security can be broadly categorized along four di-
mensions: the threats covered by the defense, the nature
of the defense, suitability of the defense to typical CPS
environments, and what specific CPS properties, if any,
are used to build defenses. Table 1 presents security
techniques relevant to the paper from general security
techniques to those specific to CPSs.The references used
here, especially for the general-purpose security tech-
niques, are not meant to be exhaustive. These are the
most recent and most closely related to FIRED.
Threat Covered: Following the duality of the CPS,
we categorize the threats covered into two groups: (1)
Cyber—These attacks target the cyber subsystem. This
group are those seen on traditional IT systems. (2) Phys-
ical—These attacks target the physical subsystem. More
specifically, it is those attacks which target sensors and
actuators. The general security techniques only focus on
cyber attacks whereas CPS specific techniques primary
focus is on physical attacks.
Defense Type: We categorize the defense types into
four groups based when the defensive method is applied
(during construction or deployment; and what properties
are provided by the defense under attack): (1) Secure-by-
Construction (SBC)—These defenses focus on prevent-
ing the root cause for vulnerabilities. (2) Detection—
These defenses focus on detecting system exploitation
during deployment. Does not involve response to a
detected attack. (3) Graceful Degradation—These de-
fenses focus on mitigating the malicious effects of an at-
tack to maintain acceptable levels of performance or to
prolong the life of the system. (4) Impersistence—These
defenses focus on denying the attacker an ability to gain a
foothold or getting rid of foothold the attacker may have
gained.
Off-line techniques (formal methods[21], type
safe languages[17], static analysis[35]) are secure-
by-construction. These techniques are ideal for low
power embedded systems since they do not pose any
restrictions at run-time. However, we have not seen wide
spread use of these techniques in CPS development yet,
except for very critical domains.
On-line security techniques focus on attack detection.
While the general security techniques focus on software
intrusion detection, the CPS specific techniques focus on
detection of attacks on physical interfaces, namely sen-
sors and actuators. FIRED fits into this category by mak-
ing attacks that exceed the reset interval impossible.
Graceful degradation under physical attacks has been
an active research area in CPS security. The main idea
here is to continue operating, perhaps suboptimally, even
under attack. In most of these papers, the threat that is
considered is an availability attack, and thus continued
operation is synonymous with security. Recently pro-
posed techniques [27, 34, 15] are approaching a point
where non-detectable levels of destruction can only af-
fect the system so slowly that stealthy spoofing attacks
will become negligible or can be coped with in practical
ways.
Impersistence is one of the crucial aspects in CPS
security in that it is almost impossible to re-install the
firmware during their operation. Moreover, it is essen-
tial for many CPS for recovery be performed without
human intervention. One of the closest techniques to
FIRED among general security techniques is proactive
recovery[9]. Their idea is similar to ours but assumes
redundancy (i.e. additional hardware) in place of inertia.
Safety of a reset in the CPS context has been discussed
before[5]. In fact, for the sake of safety, most of the CPSs
require the ability to survive reset during operation, given
that a malicious attack or hardware fault can cause the
controller to crash at any time. The novelty of our work
in this context is that by leveraging the CPS properties,
we can survive resets on systems with no additional hard-
ware.
Deployment: CPSs are diverse and so is the comput-
ing hardware used for them. While some are as powerful
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as servers used in traditional IT systems, many have only
limited processing power. In order to evaluate whether
a technique can be widely applied to CPS, we consider
two items: (1) Microcontroller Target—As an extreme
case whether the technique can be deployed, we con-
sider a microcontroller with limited processing power
and memory (e.g. Cortex-M based STM32F4-Discovery
board[1]) that executes in ROM and has no MMU. (2)
No Additional Logic—This means no special hardware
is necessary for implementing the technique.
Some of the general techniques cannot be adopted in
CPS due to their resource demand. Most CPSs that go
though mass production are resource limited due to cost.
Thus, it is usually unacceptable to increase the comput-
ing resources (e.g. CPU frequency and amount of mem-
ory) just for security reasons. On the other hand, the
addition of simple components may be acceptable as its
impact on cost can be negligible. For example, FIRED
can be implemented by using a simple timer whose con-
figuration cannot be altered from software exposed to at-
tacks.
Use of CPS Properties: The CPS properties that we
focus on are: (1) Inertia—This means that a technique
relies on the inertia of the system. (2) Predictability—
This means that a technique relies on the fact that motion
of the system can be predicted.
There is no general security techniques that leverage
these CPS properties while most of CPS specific tech-
niques make use of them. To the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to make use of both inertia and pre-
dictability of the physical subsystem.
10 Conclusion
It is natural to ask if CPSs are indeed unique, if so, how
CPS defenses should be different from general-purpose
defenses. This paper provides one answer to this ques-
tion. We construct a new defense that is only practical
on CPSs because of their properties. In contrast to prior
work on CPSs, which focus mostly on sensors, our de-
fense is tailored for the cyber portion of the CPS. We
show that new, simple to implement, low-resource, and
effective defenses are possible if we leverage the unique
physical properties of CPS.
We present a new CPS-tailored cyber defense called
FIRED that combines reset and diversification. FIRED
leverages unique properties of cyber-physical systems
such as inertia for its implementation. In a traditional
system, frequent resets will degrade the usability of the
system. In CPSs, however, the CPS can continue to move
and operate even during resets because of the momen-
tum/inertia in the system.
In this paper, we showed that FIRED is an effective
practical defense for an engine control unit and a flight
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controller. From our experiments, we determine that re-
sets can be triggered frequently, as fast as every 125ms
for the ECU and every second for the flight controller,
without violating safety requirements.
The security benefits of FIRED are two-fold: (a) the
resets deny persistence to the attacker. Each reset wipes
all volatile or corrupted state, and any write to persistent,
non-volatile storage is denied because resets happen too
frequently to complete a write to non-volatile memory
(b) resets can be used to amplify the security offered by
some diversification techniques.
The results of our work show that resets, which may
have been previously thought of as unrealistic due to
safety, can indeed be done without violating safety re-
quirements. When applicable, FIRED may be especially
useful for emerging unmanned CPSs such as drones.
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